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Pints With Aquinas

If you could sit down with St. Thomas Aquinas over a pint of beer and ask him any one question, what would it be? Every episode of Pints With Aquinas revolves around a question, a question that St. Thomas addresses in his most famous work, The Summa Theologica. So get your geek on, pull up a bar stool, and grab a cold one. Here we go!
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Now displaying: June, 2017
Jun 27, 2017

In today's episode of Pints With Aquinas we ask Thomas about knowledge and stuff (that sounded smart right? "and stuff").

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Thanks to the following awesome people who are supporting Pints With Aquinas on Patreon:

Tim Davolt, Chris Reintjes, Tom Dickson, Jack Buss, and Sean McNicholl.

James Boehmler, Laura Suttenfield, John Hipp, Kathleen Cory, Sarah Jacobs, Fernando Enrile, Travis Headly, Matthew Lafitte, Russell T Potee III, Jed Florstat, Phillip Hadden, and Katie Kuchar, and Matthew Anderson (twitter.com/Matt317A).

If you want to do that, you can do it here!

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On this point the philosophers held three opinions. For Democritus held that "all knowledge is caused by images issuing from the bodies we think of and entering into our souls," as Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is cause by a "discharge of images." And the reason for this opinion was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (De Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense is affected by the sensible, they thought that all our knowledge is affected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which impression Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images.

Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from the senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as we have said above (Articles 4 and 5). Moreover he held that sense is a power operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a spiritual power, affected by the sensible: but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself the species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) where he says that the "body feels not, but the soul through the body, which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what is announced from without." Thus according to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse the intellect to the act of understanding.

Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the "composite." And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the "composite," Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every operation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De Gener. i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for "the agent is more noble than the patient," as he says (De Gener. i, 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above (I:79:4) causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.

According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause.

ST I, Q. 84, A. 6.

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Here's what Thomas said in response to what we now call idealism:

This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons.

First, because the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood [I:84:1].

Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true" [Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5], and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so every judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true; for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension.

Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is known by like." For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself, by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says "that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone"; it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species.

ST I, Q. 86, A. 2.

Jun 20, 2017

Today I chat with Fr Ryan Mann about 15 (or so) stories about St Thomas Aquinas that we really hope are true. It's a fun episode. :)

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Please support PWA here: www.patreon.com/pwa 

Learn more at www.pintswithaquinas.com 

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HUGE THANKS to the following Patrons:

Tim Davolt, Chris Reintjes, Tom Dickson, Jack Buss, Sean McNicholl,

James Boehmler, Laura Suttenfield, John Hipp, Kathleen Cory, Sarah Jacobs, Fernando Enrile, Travis Headly, Matthew Lafitte, Russell T Potee III, Jed Florstat, Phillip Hadden, and Katie Kuchar, and Matthew Anderson (twitter.com/Matt317A).

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www.BenSound.com 

Jun 13, 2017

Please support Pints With Aquinas here: https://www.patreon.com/pwa

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Today I'll be drawing from what Aquinas has to say about sex in the Summa Theologiae. Since I'll be drawing from multiple questions, I won't put up the text this week. But if you'd like to read through those questions yourself you can go here:

Supplemental section Questions 41,42,49.

 

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HUGE THANKS to the following Patrons:

Tom Dickson, Jack Buss, Sean McNicholl, Jed Florstat, Daniel Szafran, Phillip Hadden

Katie Kuchar, Phillipe Ortiz, Russell T Potee, Sarah Jacob, Fernando Enrile

Jun 6, 2017

Today we discuss a letter Aquinas supposedly wrote to someone who asked how he could better acquire knowledge.

You'll love it.

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Please support Pints With Aquinas here: https://www.patreon.com/pwa

HUGE THANKS to the following Patrons:

Tom Dickson, Jack Buss, Sean McNicholl, Jed Florstat, Daniel Szafran, Phillip Hadden

Katie Kuchar, Phillipe Ortiz, Russell T Potee, Sarah Jacob, Fernando Enrile

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