Today we'll take a look at one of Aquinas' lesser known works, On Evil. In it, among other things, he addresses the question, can the demons read our thoughts. That's what we'll be discussing.

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Here is the Anima Christi prayer I shared:

Soul of Christ, sanctify me
Body of Christ, save me
Blood of Christ, inebriate me
Water from Christ's side, wash me
Passion of Christ, strengthen me
O good Jesus, hear me
Within Thy wounds hide me
Suffer me not to be separated from Thee
From the malicious enemy defend me
In the hour of my death call me
And bid me come unto Thee
That I may praise Thee with Thy saints
and with Thy angels
Forever and ever
Amen

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Back when I worked as an apologist with Catholic Answers we received a lot of questions around this time of year. Perhaps the most common was, “are Sunday’s excluded from Lent?”

The answer is . . . are you ready for this?

No. Sunday’s are not excluded from Lent. According to the General Norms for the Liturgical Year and the Calendar, “Lent runs from Ash Wednesday until the Mass of the Lord’s Supper exclusive” (28).

No exceptions are given for Sunday’s during Lent. In fact, a couple of paragraphs later the GN says: “The Sundays of this season are called the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Sundays of Lent. The Sixth Sunday, which marks the beginning of Holy Week, is called Passion Sunday (Palm Sunday)” (30).

So there you have it. Now, does that mean that we cannot choose to allow ourselves the things we voluntarily gave up for lent? No, it doesn’t. These voluntary fasts are personal devotions. Because they have been voluntarily taken up, we can choose to set them aside.

That said, be awesome and sacrifice this Lent. What my P.E coach told me in middle-school applies to Lent also, “mate, if it’s not hurting, you’re not doing it right.”

Link to GN here: https://www.ewtn.com/library/CURIA/CDWLITYR.HTM

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Back when I worked as an apologist with Catholic Answers we received a lot of questions around this time of year. Perhaps the most common was, “are Sunday’s excluded from Lent?”

The answer is . . . are you ready for this?

No. Sunday’s are not excluded from Lent. According to the General Norms for the Liturgical Year and the Calendar, “Lent runs from Ash Wednesday until the Mass of the Lord’s Supper exclusive” (28).

No exceptions are given for Sunday’s during Lent. In fact, a couple of paragraphs later the GN says: “The Sundays of this season are called the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Sundays of Lent. The Sixth Sunday, which marks the beginning of Holy Week, is called Passion Sunday (Palm Sunday)” (30).

So there you have it. Now, does that mean that we cannot choose to allow ourselves the things we voluntarily gave up for lent? No, it doesn’t. These voluntary fasts are personal devotions. Because they have been voluntarily taken up, we can choose to set them aside.

That said, be awesome and sacrifice this Lent. What my P.E coach told me in middle-school applies to Lent also, “mate, if it’s not hurting, you’re not doing it right.”

Link to GN here: https://www.ewtn.com/library/CURIA/CDWLITYR.HTM

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Today I chat with Dr. Robert Delfino about Thomas' 5th argument for God's existence.

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Here is the translation from the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (ST 1, Q. 2, A. 3.):

"The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God."

Here's Delfino's translation: 

The fifth way is taken from the governance of things. For we see some things that lack knowledge, namely natural bodies, act for the sake of some end. This is apparent from the fact that they always or most often act in the same way and achieve what is best [i.e., what fulfils their natural needs]. From this it is obvious that they achieve their end not by chance but by natural inclination (ex intentione). But those things that lack knowledge do not tend toward an end except under the direction of something with knowledge and intelligence, as in the case of an arrow from an archer. Therefore there is some intelligent being by whom all natural things (omnes res naturales) are ordered to an end, and this we call God.

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Defino's 10 step argument:

1. We see in nature that non-intelligent things act for a goal that is good with regularity. For example, it is in the nature of an electron to be attracted to protons, which helps to form atoms.

2. If electrons did not have this natural inclination then none of the elements on the periodic table you studied in Chemistry would form, which would mean that none of the physical life forms we know (including yourself!) would exist anywhere in the physical universe. But that would be bad, because life is good.

3. In the case of electrons being attracted to protons, we cannot ascribe such behavior to chance or to biological evolution. In the case of chance, chance would not explain why the electrons act with such regularity because chance refers to what happens rarely.

4. In the case of biological evolution, this is because the regularity of action in the case of electrons exists prior to biological evolution and is necessary in order to make biological evolution possible.

5. An intelligent cause can direct something for a goal that is good with regularity. For example, consider an archer who, with routine success, directs his arrows towards the animals he is hunting for food. However, these regular actions of the arrows, which are made of wood, do not represent the natural actions of wood. Instead, they represent something imposed on the wood of the arrows by the archer. This is similar to how a puppeteer imposes movement on a puppet, and how a watchmaker orders the part of a watch to tell time.

6. An intelligent cause is able to do this because having intelligence allows one to envision something mentally that does not yet exist physically (for example, envisioning a watch before it was invented). Non-intelligent matter cannot order itself to an end that is good precisely because it is incapable of thought.

7. However, human intelligence cannot explain why an electron has, within its own nature, an inclination to be attracted to protons because electrons exist prior to humans and humans could not exist without electrons already having these natural inclinations.

8. In our attempt to explain why electrons, as non-intelligent beings, have a natural inclination to be attracted to protons, which makes life possible, we have ruled out the material aspect of the electron, chance, biological evolution, and human intelligence.

9. Therefore, there must be some non-human intelligence that is responsible for the natural inclinations of electrons.

10. This non-human intelligence cannot achieve this by imposing activity on the electron in a manner similar to a puppeteer or a watchmaker. Instead, this non-human intelligence must be capable of endowing an electron with its being and nature.

Conclusion: We call this non-human intelligence God.

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As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13): "If a father's coat or ring, or anything else of that kind, is so much more cherished by his children, as love for one's parents is greater, in no way are the bodies themselves to be despised, which are much more intimately and closely united to us than any garment; for they belong to man's very nature." It is clear from this that he who has a certain affection for anyone, venerates whatever of his is left after his death, not only his body and the parts thereof, but even external things, such as his clothes, and such like. Now it is manifest that we should show honor to the saints of God, as being members of Christ, the children and friends of God, and our intercessors. Wherefore in memory of them we ought to honor any relics of theirs in a fitting manner: principally their bodies, which were temples, and organs of the Holy Ghost dwelling and operating in them, and are destined to be likened to the body of Christ by the glory of the Resurrection. Hence God Himself fittingly honors such relics by working miracles at their presence.

ST III, Q. 25, A. 6.

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I chat with my mate, Gomer, about what St. Thomas (and the Catholic Church teaches) about grace.

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Learn more about my guest Gomer - http://www.layevangelist.com/

And his podcast Catching Foxes here - http://www.layevangelist.com/catchingfoxes/

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Huge thanks to Philipe Ortiz and Katie Kuchar in particular for supporting to the show!

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Today I read from The Aquinas Catechism. You can get that book here: https://www.amazon.com/Aquinas-Catechism-Explanation-Catholic-Theologian/dp/1928832105

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www.PintsWithAquinas.com

Here's the article I read in the show: http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/01/31/saint-thomas-aquinas-opposed-open-borders/

Here's the link to the closed FB group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/193832791087931/

The Catechism:

Here's what the Catechism of the Catholic Church has to say about welcoming foreigners:

"The more prosperous nations are obliged, to the extent they are able, to welcome the foreigner in search of the security and the means of livelihood which he cannot find in his country of origin. Public authorities should see to it that the natural right is respected that places a guest under the protection of those who receive him.

Political authorities, for the sake of the common good for which they are responsible, may make the exercise of the right to immigrate subject to various juridical conditions, especially with regard to the immigrants' duties toward their country of adoption. Immigrants are obliged to respect with gratitude the material and spiritual heritage of the country that receives them, to obey its laws and to assist in carrying civic burdens" 2241.

The Summa

Here's what I read from Thomas:

"Man's relations with foreigners are twofold: peaceful, and hostile: and in directing both kinds of relation the Law contained suitable precepts.

For the Jews were offered three opportunities of peaceful relations with foreigners.

First, when foreigners passed through their land as travelers.

Secondly, when they came to dwell in their land as newcomers. And in both these respects the Law made kind provision in its precepts: for it is written (Exodus 22:21): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger [advenam]"; and again (Exodus 22:9): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger [peregrino]."

Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to be admitted entirely to their fellowship and mode of worship. With regard to these a certain order was observed. For they were not at once admitted to citizenship: just as it was law with some nations that no one was deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 1).

The reason for this was that if foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as soon as they settled down in its midst, many dangers might occur, since the foreigners not yet having the common good firmly at heart might attempt something hurtful to the people.

Hence it was that the Law prescribed in respect of certain nations that had close relations with the Jews (viz., the Egyptians among whom they were born and educated, and the Idumeans, the children of Esau, Jacob's brother), that they should be admitted to the fellowship of the people after the third generation; whereas others (with whom their relations had been hostile, such as the Ammonites and Moabites) were never to be admitted to citizenship; while the Amalekites, who were yet more hostile to them, and had no fellowship of kindred with them, were to be held as foes in perpetuity: for it is written (Exodus 17:16): "The war of the Lord shall be against Amalec from generation to generation."

Huge thanks to Philipe Ortiz and Katie Kuchar in particular for supporting to the show!

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We may speak about prayer in two ways: first, by considering it in itself; secondly, by considering it in its cause. The cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought to arise: and this desire ought to be in us continually, either actually or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in whatever we do out of charity; and we ought to "do all things to the glory of God" (1 Corinthians 10:31). From this point of view prayer ought to be continual: wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9): "Faith, hope and charity are by themselves a prayer of continual longing." But prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual, because we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), "we pray to God with our lips at certain intervals and seasons, in order to admonish ourselves by means of such like signs, to take note of the amount of our progress in that desire, and to arouse ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof." Now the quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for instance the quantity of the dose should be commensurate with health. And so it is becoming that prayer should last long enough to arouse the fervor of the interior desire: and when it exceeds this measure, so that it cannot be continued any longer without causing weariness, it should be discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx): "It is said that the brethren in Egypt make frequent but very short prayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest that vigilant and erect attention which is so necessary in prayer slacken and languish, through the strain being prolonged. By so doing they make it sufficiently clear not only that this attention must not be forced if we are unable to keep it up, but also that if we are able to continue, it should not be broken off too soon." And just as we must judge of this in private prayers by considering the attention of the person praying, so too, in public prayers we must judge of it by considering the devotion of the people.

Objection 1. It would seem that prayer should not be continual. It is written (Matthew 6:7): "When you are praying, speak not much." Now one who prays a long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal prayer. Therefore prayer should not last a long time.

Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx), "to pray with many words is not the same as to pray long; to speak long is one thing, to be devout long is another. For it is written that our Lord passed the whole night in prayer, and that He 'prayed the longer' in order to set us an example." Further on he says: "When praying say little, yet pray much so long as your attention is fervent. For to say much in prayer is to discuss your need in too many words: whereas to pray much is to knock at the door of Him we pray, by the continuous and devout clamor of the heart. Indeed this business is frequently done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather than with speech."

Objection 4. On the contrary, It would seem that we ought to pray continually. For our Lord said (Luke 18:1): "We ought always to pray, and not to faint": and it is written (1 Thessalonians 5:17): "Pray without ceasing."

Reply to Objection 4. One may pray continually, either through having a continual desire, as stated above; or through praying at certain fixed times, though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect, whether in the person who prays--because he remains more devout even after praying, or in some other person--as when by his kindness a man incites another to pray for him, even after he himself has ceased praying.

 ST. II-II, Q. 83, A. 14.

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Thanks to http://www.bensound.com/ for some of the music.

This is an unusual episode. Instead of looking to Aquinas we look to the Song of Songs and I share a few thoughts on it and how it relates to the spiritual life.

www.pintswithaquias.com

Please consider supporting the show - www.patreon.com/pwa

Learn more about PWA - www.pintswithaquinas.com

Learn more about Randal - http://randalrauser.com/

Randal's new book - https://www.amazon.com/Atheist-Christian-Walk-into-Bar/dp/1633882438/ref=as_li_tf_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=1467064212&linkCode=as2&tag=wwwrandalraus-20

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Huge thanks to Philipe Ortiz and Katie Kuchar in particular for supporting to the show!

Huge thanks to Philipe Ortiz and Katie Kuchar in particular for supporting to the show!

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I answer that, A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is necessary for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In the first way it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For God with His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other ways. But in the second way it was necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 10): "We shall also show that other ways were not wanting to God, to Whose power all things are equally subject; but that there was not a more fitting way of healing our misery."

Now this may be viewed with respect to our "furtherance in good." First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): "In order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature, established and founded faith." Secondly, with regard to hope, which is thereby greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "Nothing was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply Godloved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of this than that the Son of God should become a partner with us of human nature?" Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly enkindled by this; hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): "What greater cause is there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love for us?" And he afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten to love in return." Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp.): "Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown to man." Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): "God was made man, that man might be made God."

So also was this useful for our "withdrawal from evil." First, because man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they have no bodies." Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xvi): "God has proved to us how high a place humannature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a true man." And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): "Learn, O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature, refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness." Thirdly, because, "in order to do away with man's presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because "man's pride, which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be convinced and cured by humility so great," as Augustine says in the same place. Fifthly, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ," and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same sermon: "Weakness is assumed by strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that one and the same Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in the other--for this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He would not have brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not have set an example."

And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man's apprehension.

ST III, Q. 1, A. 2.

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In this episode Dr. Damian Ference and I discuss Aquinas' four remedies for sorrow.

Since go quickly through 5 articles, I won't post his text here. Instead read them online here: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2038.htm

There are three ways of knowing a thing: first, by revelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a special privilege reveals this at times to some, in order that the joy of safety may begin in them even in this life, and that they may carry on toilsome works with greater trust and greater energy, and may bear the evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul (2 Corinthians 12:9): "My grace is sufficient for thee."

Secondly, a man may, of himself, know something, and with certainty; and in this way no one can know that he has grace. For certitude about a thing can only be had when we may judge of it by its proper principle. Thus it is by undemonstrable universal principles that certitude is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now no one can know he has the knowledge of a conclusion if he does not know its principle. But the principle of grace and its object is God, Who by reason of His very excellence is unknown to us, according to Job 36:26: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." And hence His presence in us and His absence cannot be known with certainty, according to Job 9:11: "If He come to me, I shall not see Him; if He depart I shall not understand." And hence man cannot judge with certainty that he has grace, according to 1 Corinthians 4:3-4: "But neither do I judge my own self . . . but He that judgeth me is the Lord."

Thirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and thus anyone may know he has grace, when he is conscious of delighting in God, and of despising worldly things, and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any mortal sin. And thus it is written (Apocalypse 2:17): "To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna . . . which no man knoweth, but he that receiveth it," because whoever receives it knows, by experiencing a certain sweetness, which he who does not receive it, does not experience. Yet this knowledge is imperfect; hence the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 4:4): "I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified," since, according to Psalm 18:13: "Who can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from those of others spare Thy servant."

ST I-II. Q. 112, A. 5.